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INCONSISTENCIES UNDER THE "OWNERSHIP IN
PLACE" THEORY OF OIL AND GAS
By W. LEWIs ROBERTS*
The very great confusion that exists in the decisions regard-
ing the nature of one's rights to oil and gas in place, is apparently
due in large measure to the fact that the instrument used in
creating or transferring those rights has been called a lease and
also to the fact that judges and lawyers generally have not been
as familiar with the theory and nature of profits a prendre as
they should have been.
Let us consider the nature of a profit a prendre and
also the characteristics of leases by which oil and gas rights are
created and transferred. A profit a prendre is the right to
take "a part of the soil or the products of the soil from the
land of another person." 1  This includes the right to take
timber, turf, coal and minerals. "An easement," say Minor
and Wurts, "differs from a profit a prendre in that a profit
a prendre always supposes the right to take some corporeal
profit from the lands of another, while an easement merely
confers a right to use another's' land, or to compel the latter
to abstain from using it in a particular way, without taking
any corporeal profit therefrom." 2 A profit a prendre, as in
the case of an easement, is acquired by express grant. It may
be, also like an easement, acquired by prescription.3
Tiffany says that "a profit a prendre involves primarily
a power to acquire, by severance or removal from another's
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B.,
1903, Brown; A.M., 1915, Pennsylvania State College; J.D., 1920, Uni-
versity of Chicago; S.J.D., 1930, Harvard. Author of various articles
In legal periodicals, and of Roberts' Cases on Personal Property (1938).1 Minor & Wurts, Real Property, sec. 66.
2Ibid., sec. 89.
'Tiffany, Real Property (2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 1397.
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land, some thing or things previously constituting a part of the
land, or appertaining thereto, the holder of the profit a prendre
having, as an integral part thereof, rights against the members
of the community generally. . ." He then proceeds further
to remind his readers that they must carefully distinguish be-
tween a profit a prendre in minerals and an estate in the minerals
themselves. "A right to take oil and gas," he adds, "from
land in which the person so entitled has no right of ownership
is likewise, though not always expressly so stated, a right of
profit a prendre. '" 4 This right, this profit a prendre, to take
part of the substance of the soil of another, may be an exclusive
right or it may be shared with others as in the case of right
in common.5 It may be for the benefit of a particular piece of
land, that is appurtenant to land, or it may be in gross, that is
for the benefit of the owner thereof without regard to the
ownership of any other holding.0 The owner's interest in a
profit a prendre may be for a definite term of years, for life
or for an indefinite duration, just as in the case of an ease-
ment or the land itself. In other words, one may have a term
for years, a life estate, a fee simple or a determinable fee in a
profit a prendre.7 Then, too, an owner in conveying his land
may make a "reservation" or "exception" of a profit, just as
he can in the case of an easement." The ownership of a profit
a prendre carries with it the right to make such use of the
surface as is reasonably necessary to its enjoyment, and he
may bring an action of quare clausum fregit against one interfer-
ing with his right.9
Turning to the leases used to convey or create interests
in the oil and gas under an owner's land, we find that various
forms have been and are being used. One writer bts pointed
out that there are three types or three different interpreta-
tions put upon leases: the first considers that an incorporeal
hereditament, a profit a prendre, is created; sometimes called
a mining license; the second treats the conveyance as a lease
of -the land itself for mining purposes; and the third deals
with the transaction as a conveyance of the title to the oil and
4 Ibid., pp. 1396, 1397.
5 Minor & Wurts, op. cit., sec. 66.
6lbid., sec. 67.
Tiffany, op. cit., p. 1389.
"Ibid., p. 1398.
9Ibid., p. 1389.
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gas, making a severance of those substances from the surface,
creating separate estates; the latter view being possible only
where it is deemed that oil and gas are subject to ownership
in place as is the case in Texas. 10 It has been pointed out
that in many of the earlier decisions in Louisiana involving
the construction of so-called oil and gas leases, the contracts
were held to be leases and not conveyances. This is in contrast
with thd more recent decisions where they are held to be grants
of servitudes.". The late Professor Simonton has pointed out
very clearly the difference between a common law lease and a
grant of an interest in oil and gas. He said:
"It is held that no new kind of estate in real property can be
created and it follows that the interest of the lessee, as heretofore
stated, must be a license, a profit or a leasehold. It has already been
shown that the estate is not a license though it is often erroneously
so termed. A leasehold at common law contemplates a corporeal
interest in the land of which the lessee has the use and occupation
and for which he pays a compensation called rent. The lessee has no
right to destroy the substance of the soil unless such right be express-
ly conferred, but has only the right to use the premises leased. If he
takes part of the soil itself he is guilty of waste. It seems clear, there-
fore, that the estate in land which the grantee acquires under an oil
and gas lease is not a leasehold estate and that the relation of landlord
and tenant does not arise between the parties. The sole object of the
oil and gas lease is to search for and produce oil and gas, a thing which
no tenant would have a right to do without special permission granted
in his lease. The grantee under an oil and gas lease has no right in
the surface of the land except those necessary to enable him to carry
out advantageously the one object of the grant.""
This writer then concludes that the interest created by such an
instrument is a profit a prendre and points out that different
estates may be created in such interests, terms for years, life
estates and fees simple. A so-called lease to last so long as oil
and gas are produced in paying quantities, it has been sug-
gested' by Professor Simonton, cannot be deemed a term for
years. If it is of such uncertain duration, it apparently is
a fee. Furthermore, he points out that the real object of an oil
and gas lease is to develop the land in order to secure the
minerals, title to the same passing to the grantee when he re-
duces them to possession, a charactertistic of a profit a prendre.13
1o Walker, Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 7 Texas L. Rev. 1, at p. 562 (1929).
Kepper, Jr., The Judicial Nature of Oil and Gas Rights in Louis.
iana, 9 Tulane L. Rev. 275 (1935).
-25 W. Va. L. Rev. 295, at 320 (1918).
23Ibid., p. 322.
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Several courts, where the question has arisen in regard to
the nature of the rights acquired under oil and gas leases, have
recognized that an incorporeal interest is created. At an early
date the Kansas court said: "An oil and gas lease conveys no
present vested interest in the oil and gas in place. The interest
conveyed is a mere license to explore-an incorporeal heredita-
ment-a profit a prendre. "14 And the Indiana court early
took a similar view.15
The Oklahoma court is in accord. As early as 1918, in
speaking of the interest created under an oil and gas lease, it
said:
"This right to explore for and reduce to possession oil and gas Is
the proper subject of sale, and may be granted or reserved....
The right so granted or reserved, and held separate and apart from the
possession of the land itself, is an incorporeal hereditament or more
specifically, as designated in the ancient French, a profit a prendre,
analogous to a profit to hunt and fish on the land of another ...
Considered with respect to duration, if the grant be to one and his heirs
and assigns forever, it is of an interest in fee .... An interest of
less duration may be granted, and that for a term of years has been
denominated by this court a chattel real .... Such a right is an
interest in land."'
Several recent decisions in California have very clearly set
out the theory of the non-ownership of oil and gas in place.
In Callaghan v. Martin,17 the court recognized the fact that the
lessor in an oil and gas lease gives his lessee a right to drill
for and produce oil and gas. It said: "these rights of the
lessee present a clear case of a profit a prendre in gross, a right
to remove a part of the substance of the land. If the oil and
gas lessee is not granted exclusive possession of the surface by
the terms of the lease, he has nevertheless a right to such pos-
session as is necessary and convenient for the exercise of the
profit, which in fact; may preclude any other surface posses-
sion." The court denied that this right of the lessee was a
mere license to enter and explore for oil and gas. It laid down
the proposition that in California "the interest of the lessee is
an estate for years and a present interest and estate in land."
:1 Phillips v. Oil Co., 76 Kan. 783, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907), the court
said: "An oil and gas lease conveys no present vested interest in the
oil and gas in place. The interest conveyed is a mere license to
explore-an incorporeal hereditament-a profit a prendre."
Law same in Indiana; Townsend v. State, 149 Ind. 624, 47 N.E.
19, 37 L.R.A. 294, 62 Am. St. R. 477 (1897).
16Rich v. Doneghy, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 3 A.LR. 352 (1918).
173 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 Pac. (2d) 788 (1935).
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The court held in this case that a transfer of an interest in the
oil royalties, not limited to oil to be produced under a par-
ticular lease, created an interest in perpetuity. The holders
of these royalties have rights of profit a prendre, the court
said, which are estates in real property. The case of
Dabney v. Edwards,'8 decided the same year as Callaghan v.
Martin, was also concerned with the classification of oil leases
as personalty or realty for the purpose of determining whether
the agreement authorizing a real estate broker to sell was within
the Statute of Frauds. It was pointed out that the California
courts had uniformly held that an oil and gas lease created a
teim for years and was personalty. The court held, however,
that where the interest created was for a term of indefinite and
uncertain duration, which under the common law was classified
as a freehold estate in the nature of a qualified or determinable
fee, it must be classed as real property. The clause in a lease
that it shall continue "as long as oil or gas may be found in
paying quantities" gives it such indefinite duration as makes
the interest freehold in quantity, the court said.
Dabney-Johnston Oil Corporation v. Walden'9 arose over
the right of one tenant in common to produce oil without first
obtaining the approval of his cotenants. It was held that his
doing so was not waste. However, it was held he must account
to his cotenants for their proportionate shares. In the course
of its opinion, the court observed:
"The owner of land has the exclusive right on his land to drill for
and produce oil. This right inhering in the owner by virtue of his
title to the land is a valuable right which he may transfer. The right
when granted is a profit a prendre, a right to remove a part of the sub-
stance of the land. A profit a prendre is an interest in real property
in the nature of an incorporated hereditament."
Staizdard Oil Company of California v. John P. Mills Or-
ganiizatioZ,20 decided the same day as Callaghan v. Martin, dealt
with the rights of assignees of oil royalties. The decision was
that the assignees of a landowner's interest in his oil rights
created an interest or estate in real property which might be en-
forced against a grantee of the fee of the land itself. The court
regarded the oil royalty as rent and denied the application
of the principle of apportionment where the land covered by
5 Cal. (2d) 1, 53 Pac. (2d) 962 (1935).
4 Cal. (2d) 637, 52 Pac. (2d) 237 (1935).
3 Cal. (2d) 128, 43 Pac. (2d) 797 (1935).
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the assignment of the royalty was thereafter subdivided. "The
oil brought to the surface upon one of the several parcels into
which the property has been subdivided," the court said, "may
in fact be drawn from beneath the surface of the other parcels."
The California court in 1938 cited Callaghan v. Martin
with approval for the proposition that an oil and gas lease
creates a profit a prendre, vesting in the lessee an incorporeal
hereditament, which is a chattel real if it is to endure for years;
and Dabney v. Edwards for the proposition that if the lease is
to run for a "fixed time and so long thereafter as gas or oil
or either of said substances is produced therefrom in quan-
tities to pay to pump. . . ." a freehold estate is created in the
nature of a determinable fee.2 1
In contrast to the view that the transferee under an oil
and gas lease acquires an incorporeal interest, properly termed
a profit a prendre, is the ownership in place theory as to the
right created in such an instrument. The Texas court has
been the most outstanding advocate of this view. In Steph ens
County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas C0.22 it made the following
observation regarding the problem:
"We do not regard it as an open question in this state that gas and
oil in place are minerals and realty, subject to ownership, severance,
and sale, while embedded in the sands or rocks beneath the earth's
surface, in like manner and to the same extent as is coal or any solid
mineral.
"The objection lacks substantial foundation that gas or oil in a
certain tract of land cannot be owned in place, because subject to
appropriation, without the consent of the owner of the tract, through
drainage from wells on adjacent lands. If the owners of adjacent
lands have the right to appropriate, without liability, the gas and oil
underlying their neighbor's land, then their neighbor has the correlative
right to appropriate, through like methods of drainage, the gas and oil
underlying the tracts adjacent to his own." (Citing cases.) "Ultimate
injury from the net results of drainage, where proper diligence Is used,
is altogether too conjectural to form the basis for the denial of a right
of property in that which is not only plainly as much realty as any
other part of the earth's contents, but realty of the highest value to
mankind and often worth far more than anything else on or beneath
the surface within the proprietor's boundaries.
"The question whether gas and oil in place were capable of sepa-
rate ownership and sale was carefully considered and finally determined
by this court in Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 234 to 240, 176 S.W.
717, L.R.A. 1917F, 989. The opinion in that case leaves no room for
reasonable doubt as to the soundness of the conclusion that gas and
oil in place are objects of distinct ownership and sale as a part of the
Scheel v. Har, 80 Pac. (2d) 1035 (Cal. App. 1938).
2 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
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land. Moreover, we regard that view as in harmony with the over-
whelming weight of the authorities. The law of Oil & Gas, vol. 18,
Michigan Law Review, p. 459."
The court has here stated the objection most often raised
against the doctrine of ownership in place; namely, that oil
and gas are of a fugacious nature and we have the anomalous
situation of property rights being transferred by the subject-
matter of ownership passing from one man's land to that of
another. The court has attempted to meet this objection by the
observation that the loser may make good his loss by drawing
oil and gas from under his neighbor's land. A writer in the
Texas Law Review23 has very forcibly stated this objection to
ownership in place when he says:
"The true and absolute test of the ownership of a thing in all sound
legal principles, must be whether the party claiming such ownership
has such right or title to the thing that no one can lawfully take it from
him, without his consent. If this rule is made the test, then unques-
tionably a land owner has no ownership of the oil and gas underlying
his land. It is demonstrable, as above shown, that the land owner
loses all semblance of the title to oil and gas which were under his land
if they come to the surface through a well drilled by his neighbor on his
land. He can not enjoin or stop the drilling of such well, no matter
how evident it is that some part of the production of that well is from
oil and gas underlying his land, nor can he sustain any claim for
damages for such act."
Of course, one might say in answer to this contention that
since the law allowed the adjoining owner to draw the oil and
gas from under his land, there is not an unlawful taking.
In speaking of the theory of a qualified ownership in oil
and gas, Professor Simonton wrote several years ago: "The
idea of a qualified ownership of the oil and gas in place as sug-
gested in the above case (Westmoreland Natural Gas Company
v. De Witt) 24 is not only illogical but is inconsistent with the
principles of the law of real property. It leads to the absurdity
of holding that a man has title to valuable property which the
courts will not protect. As was said by 2\r. Justice "White in
Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana:
2Z
"'But it cannot be that property to a specified thing vests in one
who has no right to prevent any other person from taking or destroy-
ing the object which is asserted to be the subject of the right of prop-
erty.' "'
Greer, Ownership of Oil and Gas in Place, 1 Tex. L. Rev. 162,
at 169.
21130 Pa. St. 235, IS Atl. 724 (1889).
-177 U.S. 190 (1899).
. Sapra, n. 12, p. 297.
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Thornton, in his fourth edition on Oil and Gas, observes
that the loss of ownership in oil and gas where it flows onto
the land of another is no more strange than the loss of soil
under the doctrine of accretion;27 but the answer to this argu-
ment seems to be that the latter doctrine is an anomaly in our
property law, on the true basis of which our judges have never
been able to agree.
Mr. Justice S'eawell of the Supreme Court of California
seems to think it does not make a great deal of difference
whether you call the interest created under an oil and gas lease
a conveyance of the oil and gas in place or the creation of a
profit a prendre. In Dabney-Johnston Oil Corporation v.
Walden,28 he says:
"Although the use of different terms of description may give rise
to different aegal incidents, as to many particulars the legal conse-
quences are the same, whichever theory is adopted in a particular
jurisdiction....
"Where it is apparent from the instrument as a whole that a deed
of the mineral fee is intended, which in this state is a right of profit a
prendre, it is not essential that it contain express provision for a right
of entry to drill for and produce oil. One who grants a thing is pre-
sumed to grant also whatever is essential to its use. The right of entry
is incident to the grant of the mineral fee, and exists without express
mention in like manner as certain rights follow without express
enumeration from an ordinary deed absolute of real property."
Now if two views as diametrically different in their nature
at the start as the ownership-in-place theory of oil and gas
and the theory that the right is a profit a prendre, can reach
practically the same legal consequences, it seems pretty certain
that one or the other must be based upon a wrong hypothesis.
In view of this discrepancy between cause and effect, it seems
worthwhile to examine the decisions relative to abandonment,
ejeetment, mechanics' liens, partition, taxation, reversions and
ademption under a will, as they arise under oil and gas leases;
and see whether the Texas court, which has always been the
outstanding champion of the ownership-in-place theory, or the
California court, which is a representative of the profit a
prendre theory, is the more logical in its application of the
doctrine it advocates.
=P. 95.
Supra, n. 19.
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.AnwADONMENT
It is a well established rule of the common law that one
cannot free himself from the title to real property by abandon-
ment thereof. It seems to be equally as well established that he
can abandon his rights under an oil and gas lease. The Penn-
sylvania court gave recognition to this view in an early oil and
gas decision involving the right of abandonment. In Venture
Oil Co. v. Fretts 29 it made this statement:
"A vested title cannot ordinarily be lost by abandonment in a dess
time than that fixed by the statute of limitations, unless there is satis-
factory proof of an intention to abandon. An oil and gas lease stands
on quite different ground. The title is inchoate and for purposes of
exploration only, until oil is found. If it is not found no estate vests
in the lessee, and his title, whatever it is, ends when the unsuccessful
search is abandoned. If oil is found the right to produce it becomes a
vested right, and the lessee will be protected in exercising it in accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of his contract."
In commenting upon his passage, Professor Summers says:
"Easements may be abandoned upon the showing of an intent to do
so. Nonuser may be evidence of such intent, but the nonuser ne-d not
be for the statutbrY period. Estates, however, legal inter( ts in the
ownership class cannot be lost by an intent to abandon, established by
nonuser or otherwise. The transfer must satisfy the statute of frauds,
or else there must be an adverse holding for the statutory period. The
intent of the owner has nothing to do with loss of title by adverse pos-
session. But the court, in Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, says an 'oil lease
stands on quite different ground.' That ground could be and actually
is in later cases, the policy of development, which requires a leszee to
develop and produce or relinquish his interest. But the different
ground stated by the court is that until discovery the lessee's interest
Is inchoate or executory, and from this draws the conclusion that it
can be abandoned. After discovery the court says the int6:est is
vested.""
From these statements it seems clear that vested estates
in realty cannot be abandoned but that easements can be,3 1
and as profits a prendre are closely analogous to easements, as
pointed out by Mlinor and Wurts,32 it seems evident that they,
too, may be abandoned. 33 The holdings of the courts, which
seem unanimous on the point, are to the effect that the lessee
may abandon his rights under an oil and gas lease and this
conclusion seems consistent with the theory that the right
152 Pa. St. 451, 25 At. 732 (1893).
Oil & Gas (1927 ed.) p. 209
Tiffany, op. cit., n. 3, section 277, p. 1377.
12Op. cit., n. 1, section 66.
3Walker, Interests Created in an Oil and Gas Lease, 8 Tex. L. Rev.
483, 505.
K. L. J.-2
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created by such a lease is a profit a prendre.3 4 On the other
hand, it seems difficult to see how a court like that of Texas
can consistently hold that the lessee becomes the owner of
the oil and gas in place, for years, life or in fee simple, and
at the same time hold that he may abandon that ownership.
That court has, however, found a rather unique way of getting
around the difficulty, at least where the lease can be held to
convey a determinable fee. It holds that the cessation of the
use of the land for the purpose of exploration, development,
and production of oil and gas puts an end to the determinable
fee created by the lease, where the lessee is to hold so long
as he produces oil and gas in paying quantities. Abandonment,
therefore, terminates his estate. 35
PossEssoRY ACTIONS-EJECTMENT
To maintain the possessory actions, trespass quare clausum
freglit and ejectment, one must have title or hold under one
having title, or have had prior possession. In the case of a
lease, the lessee, under the common law, had only an interesse
termini before entry and could not maintain either trespass or
ejectment. His interest was more contractual than a property
right. After entry, he could sue anyone who interfered with
his possession under either form of action. The holder of an
incorporeal right could maintain neither trespass nor eject-
ment against a person who interfered with his interest.30 So with
oil and gas leases, the lessee generally is not allowed these
posssesory remedies before entry.3 7
The only legal remedy allowed the holder of an easement
on the land of another, was an action on the case. However,
in the case of a profit a prendre, if it is exclusive and the owner
of such right has entered on the land and proceeded to drill
in the case of an oil and gas right, courts today generally hold
that he has sufficient possession to allow him either trespass or
"4 American Wholesale Corporation v. F. & S. Oil & Gas Company,
242 Ky. 356, 46 S.W. (2d) 498 (1932); Justice v. Burgess, 244 Ky. 774, 52
S.W. (2d) 720 (1932); Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W. (2d)
1021 (1934); Kellogg v. Smith, 171 Okla. 355, 42 Pac. (2d) 489 (1935).
* Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W. (2d) 27
(1928).
36 Mills v. Willingham, Oil and Gas (1926 ed.) p. 89; Kelly v. Keys,
213 Pa. 295, 62 AtI. 911 (1906).
-1Tiffany, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 114-117; Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26
Okla. 772, 110 Pac. 902 (1910).
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ejeetment. He has the right to use the surface needed and such
right, when once exercised, will support the possessory actions. 8
The Texas court, where ejeetment is supplanted by a statu-
tory remedy to try title in the nature of an action of trespass,
allows the lessee to maintain such action whether he has entered
under his lease or not. This is at least consistent with the Texas
view that the lessee secures the ownership of oil and gas in
place,3 9 however, the remedy is a statutory one and not the com-
mon law remedy of ejectment.
PARTrrioN
The question to what extent cotenants of oil and gas rights
in land can compel partition of such interests presents a rather
searching test of whether there can really be ownership of oil
and gas in place. Of course, in those states where the lessee's
rights under an oil and gas lease are regarded as personalty,
and therefore not within the statutes relating to the partition
of realty, the cotenants' only relief is under the inherent power
of equity.40 As pointed out by Professor Summers in consider-
ing whether compulsory partition will be given in kind depends
largely upon the nature of the interests the cotenants have in the
oil and gas lands. If they own the surface and there has been
no development thereon for oil and gas or either, there seems to
be no valid objection to granting a partition in kind. Assuming
in such case the question of whether there is oil and gas under
the surface is not determined, the case would be like any other
case of joint ownership of a plot of land and no reason why the
case should not be treated in the usual way, division made on an
acreage basis. *Where it is known that oil and gas are present
but no developments have been made, the same author points out
that a majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the
question, follow the common law rule as to mineral lands and
refuse to grant partition in kind of legal interests in the oil and
gas,4 1 the general rule in the case of such lands being that par-
tition in kind will not be made. The reason given for such
"Ewert v. Robinson, 289 Fed. 740, 35 A.L.R. 219 (Okla., 1923);
Mills & Willingham, siipra, n. 36, p. 89.
Walker, supra, n. 10, pp. 565-567.
10Beardsley v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96 Pac. 859
(1908). See also Mills & Willingham, op. cit., n. 36, p. 271.
u Oil and Gas (Permanent ed., 1938), Vol. 3, p. 235.
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refusal is that the minerals may be so unevenly distributed
beneath the-surface that a division of the surface might result
in an unfair division. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has
very well stated the problem. In denying a compulsory division
of the land surface in the case of Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wide-
man Oil Co.,42 the court observed:
"This is a difficult question. True, oil and gas leases are
interrests in real estate and assignments of such are controlled by the
laws regulating the sale of real estate. But even though a part of the
realty they are different from the solid minerals in that there is no
way to ascertain their location, extent or value. They are fugitives
hidden from observation and their very existence may not be deter-
mined except by actual drilling. While this land is undeveloped and
the parties stand at arm's length, it must be borne in mind that each
of the cotenants has a valid lease to an individual moiety of the whole
tract. Oil may underlie all or any part or none of it, and a compulsory
partition of such mineral rights by laying off sections on the surface
is but an exchange of properties 'tight unseen' and, however fairly
conducted, bears more resemblance to a speculative enterprise than it
does to an equitable division."
The court did, in the particular case, grant a decree for the
sale of the property and a division of the proceeds.
Cotenants of oil and gas leases are in a different position.
The West Virginia court was one of the first to consider the
problem and it decided that a partition of oil and gas by
co-owners separate from the surface could not be had and that a
judicial partition by assignment of such interest was void.
43
The Illinois court accepted this view a few years later, admitting,
however, that the lessors who owned the surface could have a par-
tition. To quote the court's own words in the case of Waterford
Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipment:44 "Appellant had no right to a com-
pulsory partition either of the oil or gas, considered separately
from the land, or of the land itself." In the particular case, one
of three cotenants of the surface had given an oil and gas lease
to the appellant. His interest here was of less dignity than
those of the other parties to the suit.
The Kentucky court has recently made the following state-
ment in regard to compulsory partition among lessees:
"An oil and gas lease is regarded as the conveyance of an interest
in real property until those commodities shall be severed. But the
-211 Ky. 261, at 383, 277 S.W. 323 (1924).
0 Vernon v. Hall, 47 W. Va. 295, 34 S.E. 764 (1899).
233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908); also Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill.
15, 86 N.E. 597 (1908).
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nature of the property, as well as the nature of the title, sets it apart
from the classification of real estate generally. It cannot be treated in
the same manner under all conditions, such, for example, as protecting
or enforcing the rights of the owners in the same way. . . . The extent
and value of each individual part cannot be ascertained as in the case
of surface property. Hence the usual statutes providing for partition
of real estate can have no application to the partition of oil and gas
interests. There are insuperable difficulties.!'
On principle the view that lessees of oil and gas interests
are not entitled to partition in kind, seems sound. It is in
keeping with the view that the interest created by an oil and
gas lease is a profit a prendre. Such an interest is not subject
to partition under our statutes.4 6 This prohibition, however,
does not prevent the parties from getting appropriate relief
under the general powers of equity.
Now, in Texas, if the court is consistent, we have a right
to expect that lessees of oil and gas interests can have partition
under the statute granting such right. This should follow from
the position taken by that court that the lessee of an oil and
gas lease may secure a defeasible fee in the oil and gas in place.
The absence of holdings allowing partition prior to the amend-
ment of the Texas statute in 1917, suggests the conclusion that
the Texas court did not regard such partition as allowable. In
that year the Texas statutory provision for partition was
amended by adding petroleum or gas lands to the list of estates
that may be partitioned by court procedure. 47 Since this change
we find comparatively few cases where partition in kind has been
granted.48 In two of these cases, as pointed out by Professor
Summers, 49 there had been no development for oil and gas and
it was not certain that these minerals were present. This fact
brings these cases within the general rule that partition will be
4'Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Cassady, 266 Ky. 217, 218, 98 S.W.
(2d) 495 (1936).
4 1 Tiffany (2d ed.) p. 716.
47Vernon's Texas Statutes (1936), Article 6082, reads as follows:
"Any joint owner or claimant of any real estate or any interest
therein or of any mineral, coal, petroleum, or gas lands, whether held
In fee or by lease or otherwise, may compel a partition thereof between
the other joint owners or claimants thereof in the manner provided in
this chapter. (Act of 1917, p. 295.)"
8 Texas Co. v. Meador, 243 S.W. 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Hender-
son v. Chesley, 273 S.W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Woods v. Rolls,
268 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Tide Water Oil Co. v. Bean, 118
S.W. (2d) 35S (Tex. Civ. Apf. 1938).
* Op. cit., n. 41, Vol. 3, p. 237.
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granted under such circumstances. 50 The decision in some
cases has turned upon the question of whether the action was
brought in the right county and no discussion was given the
problem of whether partition should be granted. 51 Under some
circumstances, the court has refused to grant compulsory par-
tition and has granted a partition of the proceeds derived from a
sale of the interests involved.52 Provision is made for such a
disposition under the statute.53 In several cases the court
refused the relief asked because the parties did not hold estates
of the same dignity, as where a lessee asked for partition against
his lessor and his cotenant ;54 or where one who purchased an oil
lease in part of a tract of land and asked for a partition of the
whole tract,55 although in Henderson v. Chesley56 the court said
the statute does not require estates to be of equal dignity and
in Tide Water Oil Co. v. Bean57 the court so ruled. These cases
decided by the Texas court do not make out a strong case for par-
tition in kind of interests in oil and gas, even with the aid of
the statute. They seem to show that as a practical matter such
interests are not very generally treated like other interests in
land although the court says they are estates comparable to
estates in the land itself, estates in fee simple, life estates and
leaseholds.
T&xATION
When we come to the methods of taxing the lessee's interest
under an oil and gas lease, we find the problem covered by
11 Supra, n. 41.
"Gee v. Lyles, 233 S.W. 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Caldwell v.
Farrier, 248 S.W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); McKee v. McKee, 12 S.W.
(2d) 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
5' United North & South Oil Co. v. Meredith, 272 S.W. 124 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1925); Consolidated Petroleum Co. v. Austin, 283 S.W.
879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
51 Article 6096, Vernon's Texas Statutes (1936), which reads:
"Should the court be of the opinion that a fair and equitable divi-
sion of the real estate, or any part thereof, can not be made it shall
order a sale of so much as is incapable of partition, which sale shall be
for cash, or be made as under execution, or by private sale through a
receiver, if the court so order, and the proceeds thereof shall bd
returned into court and be partitioned among the persons entitled,
according to their respective interests." (Acts 1905, p. 95).
51 Medina Oil Development Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921).
s Luckel v. Barnsdall Oil Co., 74 S.W. (2d) 127 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934).
5 ftpra, n. 49.
"Ibid.
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statutory enactments in all jurisdictions.5 s As has been pointed
out by the United States Supreme Court, "Whether realty or
personalty is a question of local law upon which the local deci-
sions and statutes control.'"'" The statutes taxing the lessee's
interest generally refer to his holding as an interest in land and
tax it as such.60 Some statutes in defining real property for
purposes of taxation provide, as in the case of the Texas statute,
that "all the rights and privileges belonging or in any wise
appertaining thereto, and all mines, minerals, quarries and
fossils in and under the same" shall be taxed as real property.6 '
The Texas court has held under this statute that the lessee's
rights under an oil and gas lease, without regard to the form of
the lease, was taxable as real property.6 2 The Oklahoma statute
defining real property, like the Texas statute, refers to "all
mines, minerals and quarries" as realty.63 The court in that
state, nevertheless, does not tax the lessee's interest under an oil
and gas lease as real property.64 To do so, the court observes,
would impose "a tax upon the illimitable vista of hope."
What a legislature calls a right or interest in a taxing
statute is far from being conclusive as to what that right or
interest really is. If a taxing statute recites that all white horses
shall be taxed as black horses, it can hardly be declared uncon-
stitutional on that account provided it has not violated the rules
as to classification in other respects. For that reason the Texas
decisions upholding taxes on the lessee's interest under an oil
and gas lease are of little value in sustaining the soundness of
that courts contention that the lessee under such a lease acquires
the ownership of the oil and gas in place rather than a profit a
prendre, as maintained by the California and Kansas courts.
Besides we have seen that a profit a prendre is an interest in real
property.
-Summers, op. cit., n. 41, Chap. 26.
" W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113, 47 Sup.
Ct. 271 (1927).
Supra, n. 59.
Vernon's Texas Statutes, Article 7146.
"Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254
S.W. 290 (1923).
, 68 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 29, S. L. 1909, chap. 38, p. 574, art. 1, sec. 3.
#'Re Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Company, 43 Okla. 307, 142
Pac. 997 (1914).
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REVERsIoN
'What happens when a lessor transfers his land on which he
has given an oil and gas lease and there is a forfeiture under the
terms of the lease or the lessee abandons his rights thereunder?
Does this forfeiture or abandonment inure to the benefit of the
lessor or to his assignee of the reversion-his grantee of the
land? The learned authors of one of the leading treatises on
the subject of oil and gas answer these questions in a sweeping
generality: "The lessors interest under the lease is ordinarily a
part of the reversion. A sale of the land subject to, or without
mention of, the mineral lease will carry with it the rights of the
lessor to unacerued royalty, delay rentals and bonus. The same
is true of a transfer by operation of law.' '65
The Texas court has expressed this even more forcefully in
the case of Bibb v. Nolan6O where it says:
"When the owner of real estate conveys by warranty deed all of
his interest therein without reservation, he conveys, not only his sur-
face rights, but all of the interest which he may own in or to the
minerals or the mineral estate .... the purchaser thereof takes
the same subject to the terms of said oil and gas lease contract; and
if the oil lease is thereafterwards forfeited, the mineral estate reverts,
and becomes the property of the owner of the surface rights at the time
same is forfeited."
Courts generally seem to reach this result, the owner of the
land subject to an oil and gas lease will hold the same free and
clear of the lease upon an enforcement of the forfeiture and these
rights to the oil and gas upon forfeiture will not reinvest in
the lessor who has transferred his interest in the land itself.
It is submitted that this is the proper result to be reached under
the theory that an oil and gas lease creates a profit a prendre.
As in the case of a right of way or other easement, the assignee
or transferee of the servient tenement holds the land free from
the encumbrance when such easement is abandoned or otherwise
ceases to be. There is nothing to go back to the lessor when the
lease is forfeited or abandoned.
Now the Texas court seeks to justify its reaching the same
result under its theory that oil and gas are susceptible of owner-
ship in places and can be served from the surface ownership
and conveyed as separate estates. Such severance, the court
6 Mills & Willingham, op. cit. supra, n. 36, p. 202.
0 6 S.W. (2d) 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Walker v. Ames, 229 S.W.
365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
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says, creates a determinable fee in the lessee and leaves a possi-
bility of reverter in the lessor. This possibility of reverter, it is
held, is assignable. Under the common law conception of a pos-
sibility of reverter, such an interest could not be assigned as it
was a mere possibility. 7 The court recognized this fact in its
opinion in the case of Caruthers v. Leonard68 where, in speaking
of the lessee's estate, it is said:
"It is not an estate upon condition subsequent, because the estate
determines ipso facto upon the happening of any of the events-any
one of the failures by the lessee or his assigns to act-by which its
limitation is measured, and its termination does not depend upon the
taking of any action by anyone to determine it. ....
"All that remained to him (the lessor under an oil and gas lease)
was a mere possibility of reverter. It has often been said that a
possibility of reverter after a determinable fee cannot be assigned, as
it is not an interest in land but a mere possibility of getting back an
interest that has been granted to another, by the happening of the
event that marks its limitation."
If the Texas court really means what it says -when it lays
down the proposition that an oil and gas lease effects a severance
of the oil and gas from the surface estate and creates a new
estate in the oil and gas as such, then it would seem to logically
follow that happening of the event which terminates the lease,
that such interest would revert to the lessor who created this
determinable estate and not to his transferee of an entirely
different estate, the surface estate. As pointed out by one writer
on the subject, it is just as though the lessor owned a one hun-
dred acre tract of land and conveyed fifty acres of it to A,
creating in A a determinable fee. He thereafter conveys the
remaining fifty acres to B. If A's estate is thereafter terminated
by the happening of the event named in his deed, his estate
should certainly revert to his grantor and not to B, the grantee
of the other fifty acre tract.69
In some of its holdings, the Texas court has seemed to lay
stress upon the fact that the lessor after making an oil and
gas lease, has conveyed the surface under a warranty deed and
that his warranty estops him from later asserting any rights as
to the unacerued royalties under his lease or the mineral rights
07Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3rd ed.) sec. 13.
a 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). See also Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Jeffrey, 38 S.W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
Walker, ProJerty Interests Greated by Lease, 7 Tex. L. Rev. 1,
at 43 and 44.
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in case of forfeiture of the lease where he has failed to reserve
these rights to himself in the deed. In Robinson v. Jacobs70 we
find the court making the statement that the grantor owned the
possibility of reverter qualifying the estate of the lessee under
the lease and that his subsequent warranty deed of the land
passed this interest, which inured to his benefit upon the aban-
donment of the contemplated mineral exploration and produc-
tion, the same passed eo instanti to the warrantee. Now, in this
case, too, it would seem that if the court is correct in its assertion
that the lease created a separate and distinct estate in the oil
and gas in place, the warranty in the deed conveying the land
itself would have no effect upon the estate created in the oil and
gas after there had been a severance.
ADEMPTION UNDER A WMLt
Another decision of seeming inconsistency on the part of
the Texas court is found in Frame v. Whitaker7 where the owner
of a tract of land made a will leaving a life estate in the same
to his wife with power to sell. Thereafter the husband executed
a lease granting the exclusive rights to the oil and gas in the
same tract. After his death the widow filed suit claiming the
royalties accruing before the husband's death and the right to
have the lease canceled for a cause arising in the husband's
lifetime. It was unsuccessfully contended that since the lease
severed the oil and gas interest, thereby creating a separate estate
in them, the lease adeemed the life estate and the widow took no
interest in the tract as far as the oil and gas were concerned.
If, as claimed by the court in other cases, the lease does create
a separate estate in the oil and gas in place, it would seem that
this contention of the defendants was sound. The court admitted
that "if the testator disposed of the property or any part of it by
deed or other instrument, there would be nothing for the will
to take effect upon-the bequest would amount to nothing because
there was no property that could be bequeathed." The court,
however, failed to support this contention and held that the
widow was entitled to the royalties accruing after the husband's
death and could enforce a forfeiture for cause occurring there-
" 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309 (1923) and Donnell v. Otts, 230 S.W.
864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
717 S.W. (2d) 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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after. This holding is consistent with the view that an oil and
gas lease creates a profit a prendre and not with the view that
oil and gas may be owned in place and estates created therein
apart from the ownership of the surface.
SUMMARY
The controversy as to the ownership of oil and gas in place
has been of long standing. Some courts that at first approved
it have turned to the other theory that an oil and gas lease at
most creates a profit a prendre. The Texas court has been and
i7 the most outspoken advocate of the ownership in place theory.
We have seen, however, that on questions that really test the
soundness of the theory, that court for the most part is in accord
with the courts holding to the nonownership theory. It holds
that the lessee under an oil and gas lease may abandon his rights
under the lease although it is clearly the common law view that
estates in land cannot be so abandoned.
When it comes to the lessee's right to maintain trespass
or ejectment to protect his interest, we find that courts generally
do not allow him these actions unless the lessee has entered into
possession of the surface for the purpose of producing. This is
consistent with the law as to profits a prendre where the profits
a prendre are exclusive. The Texas cases uphold ejeetment
under a statutory enactment even where the lessee has not
entered into possession under his lease.
In granting partition of the interest created by a lease of
oil and gas, the court in Texas has in recent years acted under
a statute expressly mentioning oil and gas leases but a review of
the decisions does not show that as a practical matter such par-
tition is often resorted to and that the provision for sale and
division of the proceeds is more often the outcome of a suit for
partition.
The decisions involving taxation questions have little or no
bearing on th.e problem under consideration as taxation is a
statutory matter and the fact that most statutes provide for
taxing oil and gas rights as interests in land is not determinative
as to the nature of those rights.
It is in the dealing with reversionary rights where there
has been a lease of the oil and gas rights that we find the most
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glaring discrepancy in the bholdings of the Texas court. That
court agrees -with the general holding that where the lessor trans-
fers his reversionary interest, that is the land on which he has
given an oil and gas lease, and a forfeiture or abandonment
under the lease occurs, the transferee of the land thereby acquires
the oil and gas rights. Under the theory that a lease creates a
profit a prendre, which is similar to an easement in effect, this
result would be the correct one to reach. The holder of the
freehold would hiave his land free of the encumbrance when the
profit ceased to exist because of abandonment or forfeiture. The
oil and gas interest would not go back to the lessor. This would
not be so under a grant of a separate estate in the oil and gas
rights. There the lessor would be in the position of being grantor
of two estates, the oil and gas estate and the freehold interest in
the land itself. There the reversion in one estate should not in
any way concern or accrue to the grantee of the other estate.
Again in the case of the lessor's making a will devising the
land under which there is oil and gas and later making a: lease
of such interests, if such lease creates an estate in these minerals
apart from the land itself, then the making of such a lease should
work an ademption of the devise. We have seen that the court
in Texas has not so held but has held to the contrary.
The application of Lord Coke's dictum, non quod dictum
est, sed quod factum est inspicitur72 -not what is said but what
is done, is regarded-leads one to conclude that the Texas court
does not really hold that there can be ownership of oil and gas
in place.
Co. Lit. 36a.
